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Modeling· Virtue 
In Which a Social Psychologist Decides He Can Do Good Without Freely Choosing It 
Chuck Huff 
And now here is my secret, a very simple secret; 
It is only with the heart that one can see rightly; 
what is essential is invisible to the eye 
-from The Little Prince by Antoine De Saint-Exupery
I want to measure those essential, ephemeral things; 
things seen only with the heart. 
And the measurement is true if the heart sees my data 
and thereby sharpens its vision. 
-Chuck Huff
As a sophomore in South Georgia in 1975, I was stunned by 
the barrenness of my introduction to psychology. It was, no 
doubt, both current and correct; precise and dean. So clean, 
said my heart, that it was sterile. It stripped the 
psychological world of wonder. 
I sat in a bolted down chair in rows of 20 students each, and 
watched like you might in a surgery auditorium while the 
professor dissected my wonder. I was told I should replace 
soul, meaning, the self, altruism, and evil with negative and 
positive reinforcement, punishment, control structures, and 
other such steely and scientifically pristine constructions. 
Like Danny Saunders in Chaim Potok's The Chosen I 
wanted to know "What does experimental psychology have 
to do with the human mind?" We got rats instead, in clean 
aluminum boxes with levers and a drinking bottle. 
After lectures outlined on a rolling overhead, viewed from 
the silent ranking of seats, every day I escaped to watch ants 
run in and out of a small hole in the red Georgia clay. 
Watching REAL animals, doing real things seemed 
wonderful. It was a small ant hill; a conical mountain on 
their barren landscape, several feet from any thing 
deserving the name of grass. But they fascinated and 
comforted me with the scurrying, mysterious purpose they 
displayed. Here was real behavior, enfleshed in meaning 
and history. I was disappointed in the sterile picture my 
class gave me of these animals, and, when I got up the 
courage, I was astonished. The class was a success in at 
least one sense: I was convinced that psychology was a 
science, but I was also convinced that psychology was 
irretrievably boring. 
I'd like to take this opportunity to revise that picture of 
psychology. Psychology is surely scientific, but it is far 
from boring, and it asks, or at least hints at, some of the 
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enduring questions of the liberal arts. I want to deal with 
two main reasons for rejecting a scientific psychology as 
relevant to the concerns of the liberal arts: the claim that it 
denies human meaning and the claim that it eliminates 
personal choice and responsibility. These were certainly my 
complaints about my introduction to psychology. It was 
barren of human meaning. Tragedy and joy both evaporated 
into epiphenomena. It left us all looking like machines 
rather than people with souls. In humans, there was no room 
for soul, free will, personal choice, or responsibility. 
As a sophomore, I was most disillusioned by the denial of 
meaning. It was not until I became a senior psychology 
major that the issue of choice and free will seemed central 
to me. My reaction to the scientific claims of psychology 
about free will eventually drove me into the arms of 
philosophy, as I tried to discover why psychologists like B. 
F. Skinner felt they had to say the odd things they did. I
now think much of what Skinner said was not odd, though 1
it was couched in a now-outmoded philosophy of science .�
that required the dismissal of all mental states, and thereby ,f:
all personal meaning. And I now agree with Skinner that f
the importance of free will is overrated, though I am still
undecided on the question of whether it exists or not.
Modeling and Meaning 
The first objection, that psychology denies human meaning, t 
can be stated in a variety of ways. One claim is that I 
psychology takes no regard for the meaning of the::i 
individual human life - for the particular cares, concerns, /' 
and values of the individual. That its statistical and?: 
mathematical formulae obscure the nuance of personal\ 
�' motivation and meaning. 
Psychology must plead guilty to this charge. Psychologists 
do have a peculiar way of understanding the behavior 
organisms. It involves making models of how they behave 
think, and feel. This is a standard scientific approach) 
ranging from the precise mathematical models in Physics to 
models in Sociology that look more like traditiona 
metaphors. In fact a metaphor is a useful model, if you will 
of what a model is. 
A scientist who builds a model does so by creating 
description of the phenomenon that is suited to the purp 
and that makes allusions to other descriptions. The purpo 
is finding patterns in how organisms behave, think, and fe 
There is nothing essential about the patterns or metapho 
that makes them scientific models, except what scientists 
with them. We compare these patterns to data, and when the 
patterns can no longer be stretched to fit our understanding 
of the data, we modify the patterns. Making, testing, and 
modifying these models is what psychological science is 
about. 
And since the patterns refer to the behavior, thoughts, and 
feelings of people within a particular context, the odd 
motivations or meanings of a single individual facing that 
context are usually passed over. When they are not passed 
over, it is because they suggest something about the model 
that does not fit people of that "type" or people with a 
particular motivation--and this is then incorporated into the 
model and tested against data collected from people of that 
type or with that motivation. In summary, since 
psychological science is about modifying models, it 
overlooks the individual motivation or meaning except 
when looking might help modify the model. 
So you do not despair at the arrogance of psychologists, I 
hurry to mention that there is a therapeutic endeavor also 
called psychology that is based both in the science and in 
the concrete details and meaning of the· individual life. 
Psychologists who do therapy, or case work, or applications 
in industry often care deeply about the individual meanings 
people bring with them. These people do biography with 
their clients in addition to using the scientific models of 
psychology. And this work with individuals or groups could 
not be done well without careful attention to the individual 
meanings and motivations. So here you have a second 
hedge in my answer that psychology ignores individual 
meaning. 
But there is another way to put this complaint about 
individual meaning. My most personal reaction to my first 
class in psychology was that it stripped my world of 
meaning. It seemed not to care about the meaning in my 
life, nor to offer the help I expected in finding that meaning. 
I had hoped to find out about the deepest motivations of 
humans, about religious rapture, about evil and the struggle 
against it, about the nature of the human spirit and why I 
couldn't get a date. In short, the problem was that 
psychology didn't even attempt to ask the real questions 
about life. 
I'm afraid my answer to this charge will be disappointing to 
you. Science doesn't attempt to find out things like the 
meaning of life, or the true nature of evil. It doesn't attempt 
this because it would undoubtedly fail. These questions are 
often about what a thing "really" is "in its essence." If you 
think back about what I have said about models, you can get 
a hint that these are questions we can't get scientific answers 
for. We can improve our models about the psychological 
processes that lead to behavior we call evil or altruistic. We 
can specify the situational pressures that are likely to 
modify these processes. We can call attention to the 
systematic individual differences in reaction to the 
pressures. But none of this allows us to conclude what evil 
or altruism "really" · is. Most psychologists avoid those 
questions and attempt to get on with the process of 
modifying our models by systematic data collection. 
We are right, I think, to keep our heads down and collect 
data when these sorts of questions come up.. But we also 
over-generalize this reaction and remain silent when, 
instead, we ought to speak. With some notable exceptions, 
we usually shy away from important questions that involve 
thinking about values, ethics, and what might be called the 
"human condition." 
Sometimes psychologists have had the temerity to speak on 
human issues, and the upshot of that effort has been, in fact, 
to confirm people's suspicions of us. In our arrogance at 
those times, we reduced the complexity of the individual 
and social world to a .few principles and mechanistic causes, 
denying the richness of people's own awareness of their 
motivations and desires and ignoring the complexity of 
society and culture. The best excuse I can bring to bear for 
this arrogance is that we thought it was required of us. 
Sigmund Freud and B. F. Skinner are the two greatest 
transgressors in this arena, but some cognitive and 
evolutionary psychologists today are in danger of 
committing the same errors. The common assumption 
among these psychologists is that their theories, developed 
from a narrow domain, are ready for the totalitarian 
takeover of all human experience. This exuberance is 
usually the result of a narrow reductionism that really is 
willing to say that human .behavior is "nothing but" 
disguised sexuality, or contingencies of reinforcement, or 
schema driven processing, or kin selection. There is much 
of value in the work of the folks I have just mentioned that 
we should keep. But we should reject the tendency to 
theoretical totalitarianism. It makes for bad models, and it 
either denies or distorts our place in the liberal arts. 
Fortunately, we have fine examples of humility in theory 
construction in the work that has been going on down in the 
trenches of psychological research. Much of psychology 
now has broken down into mini-theories that attempt to deal 
with small bits of the immense complexity in a single area. 
These theories about pieces of the human experience keep 
a multitude of psychologists busy collecting data and off 
their soapboxes. For an example of a totalitarian theory and 
its demise into mini-theories, let's look at Lawrence 
Kohlberg and his theory of cognitive development in moral 
reasoning. 
According to this approach, as children age and become 
more cognitively complex, they are able to think more 
complexly about moral issues too. And this complexity 
follows a clear set of stages from early childhood into the 
adult life, starting with concrete reasoning about punishment 
and gain, and ending, for the select few, in careful reasoning 
based on principled stands. It may surprise you to hear that 
this theoretical approach has been almost entirely 
dismantled by the legions of psychologists working in this 
area. Among the many things we have found out are that 
moral development does not flow smoothly across all 
domains of reasoning, nor is individual progress in moral 
reasoning or behavior necessarily based on cognitive 
development, nor are principled stands about justice and 
fairness the only basis on which complex moral thinkers 
make their decisions. The response to this data-rich wave 
of complexity has been the building of mini-theories in the 
area: theories about the effect of peers on altruism or 
aggression, about the development of understanding of 
intention in harmful and helpful acts, about the role of 
empathy in helping, about the distancing methods used to 
deny responsibility, about the relation of childhood 
temperament to the moral emotions, and about a host of 
other things all in this one area. 
This recourse to mini-theories has occurred all across 
psychology and, in addition to providing a bracing 
reconsideration of old theories it has brought with it some 
modicum of humility. This retreat to mini-theories explains 
in part why psychologists are mostly keeping their heads 
down in the trenches these days, and also why psychology 
may seem a bit boring. 
The proximate task of a psychological science is not to 
confirm or enlighten personal meaning, but to modify and 
test models of behavior, models of thought and feeling, and 
even models of how people find personal meaning. 
Scientific psychology is not biography or personal therapy 
and we should not hold it to those standards. 
Psychology Denies Free Will 
The second complaint about psychology that I want to 
discuss is that it denies free will, and thus undermines 
personal responsibility. This accusation has been made 
variously and on several levels, but there are two that I want 
to deal with here. First, the complaint that psychology 
makes all our choices out to be predetermined by our prior 
physical and psychological states. And secondly that this 
assumption of determinism reduces personal responsibility 
by making it plain we could not have done anything other 
than what we in fact did-that in short our choices were not 
real choices-they were determined and we can be excused 
from responsibility for them. 
There is one thing we need to have clarity on: psychology 
does indeed assume determinism. It would be an odd 
science that did not. As a psychologist, I try to construct 
models of biological, psychological, social, and cultural 
processes that are empirically testable and that explain the 
particular psychological phenomenon I care about. 
Explanation is about discovering these processes, and this 
analysis does not stop at a decision or a choice by an 
individual. It looks beyond that decision to see its 
determinants. 
Perhaps an example here will help. During WWII a variety 
of people risked their lives in a sometimes successful 
attempt to rescue European Jews from the Nazis' mass 
murder. The most celebrated of these has become the 
village of Le Chambon in France. But there were small 
groups of people all over Europe who participated in similar 
heroics. In my social psychology class, I ask my students to 
write an essay explaining the social and psychological 
processes that resulted in these heroic enterprises. 
Two answers I often get are "They were courageous people" 
or "God gave them courage." I do not doubt these 
descriptions of the matter. In fact, I believe them in many 
cases to be true. But as a psychologist I must then ask the 
students how these people became courageous or how God 
gave them courage. And why did these people help and not 
some others, often equally brave? How did they get started 
helping? How did they choose the particular folks they 
helped or the way in which they helped? Why did they 
continue to help (if they did)? These are social 
psychological questions that go beyond and behind the 
decision of the person and attempt to explain that decision 
in terms borrowed from scientific models of conformity, 
social cognition, moral development, persuasion, cognitive 
dissonance, stereotyping and prejudice, attraction, and a 
host of other influences. 
The crucial question is whether by explaining these people's 
decisions and choices in this manner we have explained 
their courage away, or simply made their courage more 
intelligible. What might we be explaining away? One thing 
we might be explaining away is the peculiar stories of each 
individual helper, and the meanings this had both for that 
person and for those who helped. These are important, even 
crucial, but scientific psychology does not do biography on 
this minute scale. Nor does it deny the importance of the 
biography to the individual. It simply insists that the 
and psychological process are still there, intertwined with 
the details of the individual story. I hope that by now I 
convinced you that this is not an explaining away but 
making models of behavior and choice on a level 
ignores some of the individual detail. 
Another thing we might be explaining away is the soul 
the psyche or the self that makes these choices. This self or 
soul is ponceived by many to be independent of the social 
and psychological processes, and to insert itself into the 
these processes with a decision to help. It is this self that we 
often.call 9.ourageous or cowardly. Since it remains calm at 
the center of th� psychological storm, its courage or 
cowardice is unsullied by any of . the psychological 
processes I have been mentioning, and so the individual, or 
God, can truly claim the credit or take the blame. This self, 
not subject to our scientific models, contains the true springs 
of action. I readily admit that psychological science is 
interested in explaining away this part of what we value in 
our description of action. 
On this account,the self or soul is crucial to the decision, ·is 
inseparable from the decision, and . makes its decision 
"freely," that is, without influence from all the various 
influences on moral development I have been describing. 
And it is this "free decision" that makes it possible to say it 
is the person's decision rather than a decision that has 
happened to the person. 
This free self or soul is the center of the moral hero we find 
in many fairy tales, newspapers, and biographies, and in 
much moral advice today. She acts alone, and it is strength 
of will and courage that allow her to do good. Often she 
must act in the face of social disapproval of her good deeds 
or even threat of harm, and these threats are described in a 
way that makes it clear that they should constrain her 
decision, but her strength of will and moral integrity 
overcome them. We praise.her both for the good she does 
and for the strength of will and courage she shows. 
. And here is the danger we sense in explaining her courage 
in the causal language of moral development. We fear that 
if there is no courageous self or soul standing outside these 
explanations, then neither the courage, nor the strength of 
will, nor even the good are really hers. The courage 
happened to her, the strength of will is merely a habit or 
temperament, perhaps inherited, and the good is simply 
behavior that we call good. And so, without the courageous 
self that stands outside of psychological explanation, we 
. feel we lose the morality along with the hero. Some claim 
we lose the ability to praise people for the good they do or 
to blame them for their evil. We will have undermined the 
. motivation to do the good, and perhaps even the possibility 
.to do anything we would recognize as "good." 
Let's stop here for a moment and take a data break. When 
I discover myself in the midst of heavy philosophical 
slogging (particularly of this slippery slope kind), I often 
find it useful to look up from my armchair and ask "Could 
we possibly collect some data that might help clear the air 
here?" In this case I think some developmental 
psychologists have done so. 
William Damon and Anne Colby are developmental 
psychologists who have spent a good deal of their time 
doing research on how we develop our moral stances. They 
too have been pursuing the question of why people are 
moral, and of how they become that sort of person. In a 
recent study they did in depth interviews with a set of what 
_they call .. "moral exemplars" in order to find out how they 
became respected leaders in virtue. For this study to make 
sense, I will have to give you some background, so please 
bear with me. 
Colby & Damon's first step in their study was to compile a 
set of criteria that would identify moral exemplars. They 
did several-hour interviews with a panel of 22 moral 
philosophers, theologians, ethicists, historians, and social 
scientists to help them refine a set of criteria that might 
identify moral exemplars. This resulted in the following list 
of criteria: 
1. A sustained commitment to moral ideals or principles
that include a.generalized respect for humanity, or a
sustained evidence of moral virtue.
2. A disposition to act in accord with ones moral ideals
or principles, implying also a consistency between
one's actions and intentions and between the means
and ends of one's actions.
3. . A willingness to risk one's self interest for the sake of
one's moral values. 
4. A tendency to be inspiring to others and thereby to
move them to moral action.
5. A sense of realistic humility about one's own
importance relative to the world at large, implying a
relative lack of concern for one's own ego.
Then, beginning with their panel and moving out, they 
solicited nominations for people who excelled at these 
criteria. After a few rounds of nominations, they ended up 
with 84 nominees, a number too large to allow in depth 
interviews with all of them. Their final group of 
interviewees consisted of 23 individuals from all political 
spectra, ranging in age from 35 to 86, equally split among 
the genders, of varying or no religious background, and with 
formal education ranging from 8th grade to PhD, and MD . 
The main thing these people had in common were 
ren:iarkable stories of lives of moral commitment. Their 
causes were various, though chief among them were 
poverty, peace, and health care (particularly for the poor or 
for children). 
They then did extensive interviews with each of these, and 
used independent sources to check, as well as they could, 
biographical details revealed in these interviews. The 
resulting book contains in depth stories of 5 of these people, 
and the tentative theoretical conclusions Colby & Damon 
draw from the interviews. For my purposes here I would 
like to highlight some of the commonalties they found 
among their sample of moral exemplars. 
1. A self concept that was closely aligned with their vision
of the good, so much so that there was no choice
between the self and the good, but instead a unity.
2. A constant examination of the self and its goals and an
openness to change in these, influenced heavily by the
communities in which they were embedded.
3. A clear feeling that they could not have done otherwise
than they did.
I am not surprised that these conclusions match in many 
respects those of psychologists who have studied people 
who helped rescue Jews during the Holocaust. I am 
particularly taken with the final point, that these moral 
exemplars often felt that they had become the kind of people 
who could not have done other than to help in the way they 
did. Their choices were constrained by their own, publicly 
made commitments, by the communities of caring in which 
they were embedded, by their own clear sense of what the 
good was, by their close identification of who they were 
with that good, and by their past history of following that 
sense of the good. To have done something other than help 
would have been not to be who-they�were in that situation. 
This feeling of constraint is often echoed by those who 
helped Jews during the Holocaust. 
Now, let's trek back to the issue of free will, the self, and 
our moral hero. These real life moral exemplars do not 
sound much like the moral hero. Toe moral hero acts alone, 
while our moral exemplars are embedded in communities of 
concern. Toe moral hero makes a decision to do the moral 
thing, and it is this decision for which we praise her. Our 
moral exemplars live in a way that they feel constrained to 
do the moral thing-so that their moral action flows from 
their life and the demands of their surroundings. 
It is possible that Colby and Damon, in their search for 
moral exemplars, missed the real moral heroes out there 
Perhaps the sampling strategy missed them. Perhaps the 
interview situation required self-deprecating comments 
about constraint. We will, of course, want to do more 
research. But perhaps too we have rediscovered something 
about virtue that Aristotle mentioned when he said that 
virtue was a learned habit and that one role of real 
friendships was to support the friends in their endeavors to 
be good. Toe friendship our moral exemplars found in 
community enabled them to practice and extend the other 
virtues they held dear. They did not always see the good, but 
when their friends pointed it out, they looked carefully, and 
took the advice seriously. Their openness to expanding 
their conception of the good over their lifetimes was an 
index both of their commitment to the good and to the 
seriousness with which they took their friends. 
The free will that we so desperately desire can be found in 
this account of moral development, but it is not central. I, 
frankly, do not miss it. Our moral exemplars were 
constantly reexamining their understandings of the good, 
and constantly revising their behavior to accommodate their 
understanding. And so they were choosing, but they were 
choosing their constraints. To the extent that we are 
creatures whose self-examination, based on our friendships, 
causes us to redirect our thoughts, goals, and behaviors then 
we can say there is some choice or free will here. But it is 
an odd sort of free will, not really like our moral hero, and 
based on choice among constraints. Its exercise makes 
possible, real, genuine, human, and humane goodness, with 
all its shortsightedness and folly, and with all its glory. 
The moral exemplars in Colby and Damon's study did not 
reach their lofty ethical heights in a flash of willpower, but 
by constant small choices. They took a path that often 
seemed the only one available, given their personal and 
situational constraints. Sometimes on the journey they found 
they had gotten up a path it was impossible to back down. 
But given their understanding of the good, given the 
communities they found themselves in, given their empathy 
for suffering, it was better to go on than to pause. They had 
chosen some of their constraints (the villagers of 
LeChambon chose their pastor knowing what he would 
preach). Other constraints were thrust upon them. 
If this sounds restrictive and difficult, if it feels oppressive, 
remember the long Christian tradition of the "slave for 
Christ." Freedom, in this tradition, consists of perfect 
obedience to the constraints imposed by Christ's love for us 
and for others. Jewish and Muslim traditions also include 
this idea. This context is perhaps the right place to mention 
two other characteristics of the moral exemplars Colby and 
Damon studied. 
4. Most, though not all, were grounded in some religious
belief and community.
5. All, without exception, were optimistic about their life
and genuinely happy.
None that these are people who feel they could not have 
done other than what they did, and they seem genuinely 
happy about it. A Benedictine nun I know says that her 
practice is built out of doing the next thing. Toe goals are 
not lofty, the will is not central, what is central is "these 
people now who need help" or "this phone call I must 
make." If the constraints are correctly chosen, and if one 
has both luck and some skill, doing good is within our 
capacity regardless of our level of heroism. 
d so my conclusion about free will is to doubt its · 
· entrality to moral reasoning and action. Our picture of real 
oral exemplars suggests we need only an odd form of free 
ill, based on the choice of constraints, to be recognizably 
oral. More central to our moral exemplars is constraint in 
the form of self-image, community influence, situational 
qemands, past history, and public commitment. We should 
worry less about free will and more about appropriate 
'onstraint. In this picture of the moral exemplar, choice is 
not at center stage. Moral development is the main story, 
guided by community influence, situational constraint, ·self 
.fmage, and occasional and often limited personal choice. 
}Bringing the lesson home to the academy 
tin the epigram at the beginning of this paper, I provide a 
scientist's reply to Saint-Exupery's insistence that only the 
/heart can see the essential things: psychological science, 
with its measurements and models, can help sharpen the 
heart's vision by providing maps and pointing at the places 
of interest. The model of the moral exemplars I have laid 
out in this paper has done just that. It suggests that a focus 
on morality as choice (with all the free will baggage this 
implies) will not help us understand the moral development 
· ofreal moral exemplars. Instead, we need to understand the
· moral exemplar as someone who cultivates moral virtue
within a community of commitment.
, Those who read the maps, clinical psychologists, reporters,
consultants, humanists, should not complain, as I did as a
sophomore, that the map is not the landscape. It requires
detachment to read (and certainly to construct) a map. But
we should not mistake that methodological detachment for
•·· a lack of concern about the real world. Indeed, the reason I
collect data and make models is because of a passionate
belief that these will help us understand humans and human
1 concerns. It was a human concern with encouraging
· morality that led me to the scientific study of morality. This
suggests that a scientific psychology can, despite my
sophomoric objections, lead us to talk about deeply
meaningful issues in a way that is respectful of our
humanity.
(What does this excursion into scientific psychology suggest 
.• about how I might now teach my sophomores? First, I
1 know my early resistance to psychology as a science
informs my presentation of it today. I help students struggle 
with the detachment that is required to do a scientific 
psychology. I cannot help them get a date, but I can help 
them understand the attraction process and some basic 
patterns of mate selection. The proper use of a map requires 
stepping back from the particular and getting a larger 
picture. This is hard when this Friday night stretches out in 
endless isolation. But it should be attempted. Some 
discussion about what a scientific psychology can and 
cannot do for us is a helpful way to begin the attempt. 
Second, instead of submerging my students in the minutia 
of the science, I make sure to point out the larger features of 
the landscape, and especially those that connect to our 
concerns in the liberal arts. A scientific psychology can 
give us a different perspective on truth, beauty, and 
goodness. It cannot answer the question of what they really 
are, but it can contribute to the discussion about how we 
might attain them. 
One byproduct of the argument in this paper is a 
complication of C.P Snow's claim that there are two 
cultures: one of science and one of humanism. This is an 
issue less of how I treat my students and more of how I treat 
my colleagues. As I hope this paper shows, there is nothing 
in the nature of the two endeavors that makes this split 
necessary. We can at least talk across the divide. And 
perhaps even make friends. 
*. This paper was originally the Fall, 1998 Mellby Lecture 
delivered to the faculty of St. Olaf College, in honor of Carl 
Mellby, a great soul and polymath on the faculty. For those 
who care about such things, I would like to acknowledge my 
indebtedness to: the works of Daniel Dennett and Ted 
Honderich on the free will problem; to John Darley and 
Kelly Shaver for imparting an abiding interest in moral 
reasoning and behavior; to Ed Langerak for insisting that I 
defend my notion that I could do well (and even do good) 
without free will; to L. DeAne Lagerquist for taking my 
forays into religious studies with the appropriate amount of 
seriousness and patience; and to Teresa Tillson for her 
constant intellectual companionship and her steadfast 
interest in virtue. DeAne Lagerquist, Matt Rohn, Doug 
Schuurman, Gordon Marino, Rick Fairbanks, Ed Langerak, 
and Carol Scholz provided much needed feedback on the 
lecture version of this paper. 
